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Considering  a  pure  coordination  game  with  a  large  number  of  equivalent 
equilibria, we argue, first, that a focal point that is itself not a Nash equilibrium 
and  is  Pareto  dominated  by  all  Nash  equilibria,  may  attract  the  players' 
choices. Second, we argue that such a non-equilibrium focal point may act as 
an equilibrium selection device that the players use to coordinate on a closely 
related  small  subset  of  Nash  equilibria.  We  present  theoretical  as  well  as 
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1.  Introduction 
  Many social interactions can be modeled as a coordination game. The players 
have a common interest, but as there are multiple equilibria, the desired outcomes 
are only achieved if they mutually adjust their actions in the right way and go for the 
same equilibrium. 
  Peyton Young (1993) distinguishes three broad equilibrium selection theories: 
First, some equilibria may be a priori more reasonable than others (see, e.g., John 
Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten, 1988). Second, it might be that "agents focus their 
attention on one equilibrium because it is more prominent or conspicuous than the 
others"  (Peyton  Young,  1993,  p.  58).  Third,  expectations  may  converge  on  one 
equilibrium through precedent (see, e.g., Vincent Crawford and Hans Haller, 1990).  
  Our paper will be most closely related to the second of these theories, but it 
will  differ  from  all  three  of  them.  In  our  game  there  will  be  no  equilibrium  more 
reasonable or conspicuous than others, and in the (experimental) setup that we will 
consider, precedence can be of little help since we will consider a sequence of one-
shot games with very limited information feedback. 
Thomas Schelling (1960) recognized that in everyday life individuals who are 
confronted with coordination problems frequently seem to do much better than they 
would by choosing randomly among the equilibria, and that focal points may play an 
important role in this by providing a point of convergence for individual expectations.
1  
As  Thomas  Schelling  (1960)  put  it:  "Most  situations  -  perhaps  every  situation  for 
people who are practiced at this kind of game - provide some clue for coordinating 
behavior, some focal point for each person’s expectation of what the other expects 
him to expect to be expected to do. Finding the key, or rather finding a key - any key 
that  is  mutually  recognized  as  the  key  becomes  the  key  -  may  depend  on 
imagination more than on logic; it may depend on analogy, precedent, accidental 
arrangement,  symmetry,  aesthetic  or  geometric  configuration,  casuistic  reasoning, 
and who the parties are and what they know about each other" (p. 57). 
We  will  consider  the  role  of  focal  points  as  a  coordination  device,  but  our 
starting point will be a simple two-player matrix game with common interest and a 
multiplicity of equivalent and efficient Nash equilibria (NE), none of which stands out. 
We  introduce  a  salient  payoff  by  reducing  one  of  the  equilibrium  payoffs,  thus 
eliminating  the  equilibrium  property  of  the  corresponding  strategy  profile.  The 
question, then, is whether this alteration of the incentive structure (creating a single 
                                                 
1 For a recent discussion of Schelling's analysis, see Robert Sugden and Ignacio Zamarrón 
(2006).   3 
different  payoff)  may  help  individuals  to  coordinate,  even  if  this  payoff  is  not  an 
equilibrium and it is Pareto dominated by the equilibrium payoffs. 
The main contribution of our paper, then, is that we present two new ways in 
which such a non-equilibrium focal point may help to solve coordination problems. 
First, we will explain that such a non-equilibrium focal point may be an attractor in 
itself for the players. Second, we will explain that such a focal point may act as an 
equilibrium selection device enhancing coordination by becoming a stepping stone 
from which players jump to a closely related small subset of NE that in themselves 
are not salient. We will present theoretical as well as experimental support for these 
two new roles of focal points. The experimental evidence presented will also show 
that the effect of the focality depends, in a clear way, on the level of the focal payoff, 
and that the effect of the focal point becomes substantially stronger as the players 
have time to reconsider and adjust their actions. 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present 
the coordination game that we study, and discuss its relation to the literature. Section 
3 derives some theoretical observations, and section 4 explains the design of our 
experiments. Section 5 proposes a set of hypothesis, while in section 6 we analyze 
the results of the experiments. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2.  A coordination game and some related literature 
In order to isolate the effect of a salient non-equilibrium payoff, we present a two-
player  artificial  game  based  on  the  payoff  matrix  in  Figure  1.
2  The  game  is 
represented in normal form with player 1 choosing from the set of rows (r1, …, rn) and 
player 2 form the set of columns (c1, …, cn). To each pair (ri, cj) corresponds a payoff 
as indicated in the corresponding cell of Figure 1. The game has thirty equivalent 
pure NE leading to a payoff of 100 for each player. Any miscoordination leads to a 
payoff of 0. Notice that neither risk considerations nor payoff considerations would 
allow distinguishing any of these NE. Consequently, for this game, in which players 
are indifferent about the equilibrium they reach, but happy to reach any one of them, 
and in which there is no communication between the players, it seems exceedingly 
difficult to say what coordination will be observed and what could explain the choice. 
 
  ++++ Figure 1 about here ++++ 
 
                                                 
2 Real-life games come with frames. The game is artificial because we try to mute them.   4 
The question we address is whether the introduction of a focal point might help to 
improve coordination. To this end, we take one of the NE, and replace its payoff πNE 
=  100  with  a  payoff  πFP,  with  0  <  πFP  <  πNE  =  100,  whose  uniqueness  confers 
salience.  Notice  that  this  destroys  the  equilibrium  property  of  the  corresponding 
strategy  profile,  as  each  player  could  unilaterally  deviate  to  get  a  payoff  of  100 
instead, thus realizing one of the NE. Hence, what we get after the manipulation is a 
game with twenty-nine NE and one salient non-equilibrium payoff forming a focal 
point. Notice also that the focal point is Pareto dominated by all NE.
3 
  We want to stress that this modified payoff would not be salient because of 
“some kind of conventional priority” (Thomas Schelling, 1960, p. 64) that makes it a 
special equilibrium. In fact, the focal point that we consider is not an equilibrium at all, 
and  it  is  prominent  only  because  it  has a payoff  which  is  different  both from  the 
equilibrium  payoffs  and  from  the  remaining  non-equilibrium  payoffs.
4  That  is,  the 
salience is not an extra attribute of one of the equilibria but results from the difference 
in payoff from the equilibrium payoffs. In this sense our paper belongs to the tradition 
of  formal  game-theoretical  analysis,  as,  in  our  game,  subjects  will  have  an 
opportunity to coordinate thanks to the modification of an element that is structural to 
the game, a payoff, rather than on contextual cues.
5 In fact, we strive to make all 
equilibria “nondescript” (in the sense of Michael Bacharach, 1993) by keeping labels 
or frames as much indistinct as possible.
6 In other words, in this game, the players’ 
own description of their options (see D. Gauthier, 1975) should be useless to play the 
game, except when this description refers to the payoff amounts.
7 
  Our purpose in the paper is to analyze how this salient non-equilibrium payoff 
can become a correlating device that enhances coordination. In particular, we want 
                                                 
3 Hence, the focal point is not "collectively rational" (Robert Sugden, 1995). 
4 A focal point, as defined by Schelling, is the Nash equilibrium on which players coordinate. 
Our focal payoff is not an equilibrium. Only its salience makes it qualify as a “focal point”. 
5  With  rich  framing,  how  do  we  adjudicate  priority  among  frames?  In  the  words  of  Ken 
Binmore and Larry Samuelson (2006, p. 3), “is an action that is red but not square more focal 
than an action that is square but not red?”. Payoffs, on the contrary, are not subject to such 
ambiguity. 
6 In pure coordination games with n equivalent equilibria, environmental signals, “labels” or 
“frames” (see Judith Mehta, Chris Starmer and Robert Sugden, 1994, or Ken Binmore and 
Larry  Samuelson,  2006)  become  strategically  relevant,  since  they  are  the  only  distinct 
elements  that  subjects  can  recognize  to  coordinate  their  decisions.  In  these  games, 
valueless labels become the choice set, and subjects receive utility only if they choose the 
same label. 
7 If, in addition to the payoff difference, the game contained frames, players might identify 
more than one salience, making coordination more unlikely and any analysis more difficult. 
For double focal points, where frame and payoff differences coexist, see Vincent Crawford, 
Uri Gneezy and Yuval Rottenstreich (2007).   5 
to find out, first, whether and when this different payoff can act as a focal point in 
achieving coordination upon itself, in preference to the Pareto-dominant equilibrium 
payoffs. And, second, under what circumstances players use this focal payoff as a 
device  to  coordinate  on  a  closely  related  small  subset  of  NE,  even  though  the 
equilibria  selected  are  not  in  themselves  salient.  We  run  laboratory  experiments 
under different treatments. Each treatment will be characterized by a different payoff 
associated with the focal point. And so, we will ask, is the degree of coordination 
dependent on the focal payoff amount? To state it differently, is there more or less 
coordination  when  the  amount  of  the  focal  payoff  approaches  the  amount  of  the 
equilibrium payoffs? And also, how does the coordination shift from the focal payoff 
to one of the NE when the amounts of the salient payoff change? 
 
The  game  considered  seems  to  capture  an  essential  feature  of  many  real-life 
situations, where coordination may be achieved through second-best or dominated 
outcomes. Consider, for example, a variation of Thomas Schelling’s "Meeting in New 
York City" game. Two people have an appointment at a certain time at a city's main 
square.  As  the  square  is  large  and  crowded,  it  is  imperative  that  the  two  people 
coordinate by choosing the same location. In general, many equilibria will exist. A 
focal point in the form of a fountain in the middle of the square may be helpful to 
reach such an equilibrium But both people independently going for the fountain is not 
necessarily one of the equilibria. Suppose it is raining and the square is bordered by 
a number of pubs and bars. If one of the people were to go for the focal point of the 
fountain, the other would be better off heading for the comfort of one of the many 
bars where he could keep an eye on the fountain while enjoying a drink and avoiding 
the  rain.  If  both  people  independently  headed  straight  for  one  of  the  bars, 
miscoordination would be likely, unless they happened to choose exactly the same 
bar. 
Focal points may play a similar role with respect to contributions in threshold 
public good games, in which some valuable public good will be realized if and only if 
a certain threshold in the number of contributions is reached, and in which further 
contributions beyond the threshold do not further enhance the public good (see, e.g., 
Theo Offermans, 1997). In such games, typically many asymmetric equilibria exist, 
equilibria  in  which  exactly  the  required  threshold  is  reached,  with  some  people 
contributing and others not. Such asymmetric equilibria may be difficult to realize. 
And the symmetric equilibrium of nobody contributing might prove more attractive 
over time than any of the asymmetric equilibria in which the public good is realized 
(see John Ledyard, 1995). Now, let us assume that policy makers do not care which   6 
of  the  equilibria  is  realized  as  long  as  the  outcome  is  not  the  symmetric  no-
contributions NE. This is, again, an equilibrium selection problem for which a non-
equilibrium  focal  point  may  help.  Suppose  policy  makers  introduce  a  law  making 
contributions compulsory for everybody. As the realization of the public good requires 
only a certain threshold of contributions, everybody contributing does not constitute a 
NE.  But  such  a  law  might  very  well  create  a focal  point  (see Richard  McAdams, 
2000) that could help to solve the equilibrium selection problem by eliminating the 




This paper is related to a strand of literature concerned with repeated coordination 
games. In these, it is the repetition of the game with the same players -its history, so 
to speak- that allows some equilibria to become focal points on which players can 
learn to coordinate (see Vincent Crawford and Hans Haller, 1990, or Andreas Blume 
and Uri Gneezy, 2000). Instead, we consider a situation in which players play the 
game repeatedly but are matched randomly. While the game has a history for each 
player, this history does not make some equilibria focal. It is a weak history that does 
not de-symmetrize the game. To help coordination, an asymmetry is exogenously 
created in the payoffs. Unlike Vincent Crawford and Nagore Iriberri (2007b), where 
their  game  (with  frames)  is  analyzed  as  if  the  payoffs  were  perturbed  to 
accommodate  the  instinctive  attraction  of  salience,  in  our  game  (where  frames 
should not exist), a payoff is actually perturbed (shaved) in order to give it salience, 
albeit simultaneously depriving it of its equilibrium properties: While positive salience 
(attraction)  is  conferred  to  one  payoff  by  distinguishing  it  form  the  rest,  negative 
salience  (repulsion)  is  simultaneously  conferred  to  it by  shaving  its  value.
9  In  the 
agents’ minds, both types of salience will fight for prevalence. 
Our paper also relates to previous research on the powerful effects of non-
equilibria. The phenomenon that players may be attracted to non-equilibria or that 
out-of-equilibrium  payoffs  may  have  an  impact  on  the  equilibrium  towards  which 
                                                 
8 Why not make one of the asymmetric equilibria a focal point through some expressive law? 
There may be so many possible equilibria that it may be difficult to decide which one to make 
focal by law. Asymmetric equilibria in public goods games might be politically unattractive, 
and  a  symmetric  focal  point  might  be  easier  to  sell  as  it  is  not  only  inherently  more 
conspicuous but probably also seen as more fair. 
9  From  an  implementation  perspective,  subtracting  from  a  payoff  may  be  a  feasible 
procedure, while adding to a payoff may not be. In any case, making a payoff salient by 
increasing it would make the problem of coordination trivial, from a behavioral perspective: 
The players “should not have any trouble in coordinating their expectations” (John Harsanyi 
and Reinhard Selten, 1988) p. 81) at the single payoff dominant equilibrium.   7 
players  are  attracted  has  been  pointed  out,  e.g.,  by  Thomas  Schelling  (1960), 
Margaret  Gilbert  (1989),  Russel  Cooper,  Douglas  DeJong,  Robert  Forsythe  and 
Thomas  Ross  (1990),  and  Giovanna  Devetag  (2000),  who  all  explain  this 
phenomenon either by risk or fairness considerations. Our game is different in that, 
instead  of  risk  or fairness  considerations,  the  importance  of the out-of-equilibrium 
payoff is simply due to its salience. 
  Finally,  Joel  Huber,  John  Payne  and  Christopher  Puto  (1982)  present  a 
phenomenon nowadays well-known in marketing that seems very similar in spirit to 
the role of our focal points. Suppose consumers want to compare various products 
across a number of dimensions (size, quality, color, price), with different dimensions 
favoring different products. This might be a difficult consumer problem. They found 
that  the  following  has  a  serious  impact  on  consumer  decisions:  introducing  an 
asymmetrically dominated alternative. That is, they introduce a new commodity in the 
market that is dominated in all dimensions by one of the existing products. The result 
is that this dominating product is going to be hugely favored by the consumers. This 
is similar in spirit to the use of the focal point in our game. In both cases individuals 
face  a  difficult  decision  problem  full  of  uncertainty.  In  the  marketing  case  this 
uncertainty is due to the difficulty of comparing products across many dimensions. In 
our case it is strategic uncertainty concerning the choices made by other players. In 
both cases an option is introduced that  as such may perhaps not be a solution. But 
this option may act as a stepping stone to reach such a solution. 
 
 
3.  Experimental design 
All sessions took place in the computerized experimental laboratory (LeeX) at the 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona between 2002 and 2004, and lasted about 
one hour each. The subjects were volunteer undergraduate students in Humanities, 
Commercial  Studies,  Business  Administration,  Law,  Economics  and  Political 
Science. In each  session  there  were  18  players  simultaneously  in  the  laboratory. 
Participants sat in front of personal computers, and could not observe the screens of 
other players nor communicate with them. They were given written instructions (see 
Appendix  2).  The  instructions  contained  information  about  the  mechanics  of  the 
session and about the subjects' gains, which consisted of a payoff that depended on 
their  decisions  and  the  decisions  of  the  subjects  they  were  matched  with.  On 
average, subjects made about €12 in addition to the show-up fee of €3.   8 
Each session included two experiments (a one-shot version and a 50-period 
version), which were carried out sequentially.
10 We choose to experiment both with a 
one-shot game and with a repeated game with random matching. One-shot games 
allow concentrating on the role of focal points. But in games with some complexity, 
subjects may need more that one round to observe the focal point, and more than 
one round to learn to coordinate. We choose a random matching scheme in every 
round to abstract from any reputation or signaling effects. Such a random matching 
scheme allows subjects to acquire experience while avoiding creating a supergame. 
The basis for both experiments is the game with a large number of equivalent NE 
presented in Figure 1. To help avoid any of these NE being more prominent (as this 
would imply the occurrence of spurious focal points), we added a row and a column 
with only 0 payoffs at each side of the matrix.
11 The largely empty center of the matrix 
is  intended  to  serve  the  same  purpose.  Notice  also  that  no  equilibria  lie  on  the 
diagonal, and that there are no labels distinguishing the actions.
12 We used a number 
of variations of this game that consisted of rotating or mirroring the payoff matrix and 
changing the colors assigned to the row and column players. The instructions of the 
experiments as well as some sample screenshots can be found in Appendix 2.
13 
We shaved one of the 100 payoffs to make it focal and used this focal payoff 
as a treatment variable to create four different treatments for the two experiments in 
each  session.  The  values  for  the  focal  payoffs  used  were  46,  87  and  99  points, 
respectively.
14 In addition, we ran a control treatment in which this payoff was 100 
points, effectively eliminating the focal point.
15 This control treatment was meant to 
alert  us  of  the  existence  of  any  nuisance  attributes  on  which  subjects  could 
coordinate.  Apart  from  the  focal  payoffs  there  was  no  difference  between  the 
treatments. We  ran  eight  sessions  with  the  “46”  treatment,  and  six  sessions  with 
each of the treatments “87”, “99” and “100”. 
                                                 
10 Due to a computer glitch, one session (46.2) lasted only 45 periods. All analyses have 
been adjusted for this. For example, when considering the last ten periods we use periods 
36-45 rather than periods 41-50 for this session. 
11  Notice  that this  implies  that  each  of the four  corners  of the matrix  constitutes  a  Nash 
equilibrium as well, with payoffs as low as those of the worst possible miscoordination. We 
will neglect these four non-strict Nash equilibria throughout the paper. 
12 Once the instructions were read, subjects faced the payoff matrix on the screen for the 
remaining  of the  session.  No  natural  language  was  used  on  the  screen,  thus  limiting  its 
possible confounding effect (see, e.g., Glenn Harrison, 2005). 
13 These instructions were translated into Spanish for the experiments. The complete set of 
matrices used is available from the authors. 
14 In one session (46.4), by mistake we actually used a focal payoff of 47 rather than 46. 
15  The monetary  reward  in  Euros  per  experimental  payoff  point  was  constant  across the 
treatments. Notice that making the focal payoff equal to 100 takes the game back to its 
original format as described in Figure 1.   9 
At the start of each session, the subjects were split into two separate groups: 
row  and  column  players.  Each  group  was  assigned  a  color  that  was  used  in  the 
matrix on the screen.  For example, 'yellow' players choose an action by clicking one 
of the yellow cells on top of the columns, while 'blue' players did this by clicking on 
one of the blue cells preceding the rows. The colors used changed from session to 
session. 
All subjects had to play in both of the two experiments of each session. In the 
first experiment subjects played, with no time restriction, a one-shot version of the 
game by simply choosing one row (column). This was for a high payoff of €1.00 per 
10 experimental payoff points. Once their decision was made, they did not receive 
any  feedback  on  the  results  of  the  game,  and  proceeded  straight  to  the  second 
experiment. This second experiment used exactly the same payoff matrix, and each 
player kept the same role (either row or column player). In this second experiment 
the subjects would play 50 rounds of the same game, randomly re-matched in each 
round to one of the players in the other group. In this experiment, after each round 
each player was told his payoff, but not the action chosen by the other player The 
monetary reward in the 50-period second experiment was €0.05 per 10 experimental 
payoff points. 
The purpose of the first experiment was to test whether introspection, logic 
and imagination would suffice for the players to coordinate successfully.
16 Moreover, 
the first experiment prepares the stage for the second one. Paying up to €10.00 for a 
single decision in a two-player coordination game, and giving the players all the time 
they  wanted,  was  done  to  motivate  and  allow  the  players  to  examine  the 
characteristics of the game carefully right at the beginning of the first experiment, 
thus  avoiding  a  slow  and  leisurely  start  of  the  second  experiment  (with  agents 
learning and discovering the game 'on the fly'). Notice that since we did not provide 
any  feedback  on  the  first  experiment,  there  is  no  endowment  or  learning  effect 
related to the outcomes of the first experiment. 
 
4.  Theory of focal points 
The existing literature on the role of focal points consists essentially of finding ways 
to  formalize  a  justification  to  coordinate  on  a  focal  equilibrium.  When  there  are 
multiple equilibria, the focal point can act as an equilibrium selection device in the 
sense of rendering one of the equilibria more prominent than the other(s). This idea 
                                                 
16 Schelling (1960): “But in the final analysis we are dealing with imagination as much as with 
logic” p. 58).   10 
of players choosing one equilibrium that stands out has been formalized in various 
ways (see, e.g., Vincent Crawford and Haller, 1990, Robert Sugden, 1995, Michael 
Bacharach  and  Michele  Bernasconi,  1997,  Maarten  Janssen,  2001,  and  André 
Casajus, 2001).  
In this section we show that this literature can also help to elucidate that a 
focal point may play an important role in achieving coordination, even when this focal 
point is not itself an equilibrium. As we will show, this theory explains both of the two 
roles of a focal point that we present in this paper, although neither role of a non-
equilibrium focal point has been recognized in the literature. 
  Consider,  as  an  illustration,  the  following  two-player  simultaneous-move 
coordination game. Suppose there are five white balls on a table, and if both players 
choose the same ball, they get a payoff  of 100, whereas they get nothing in case 
they do not coordinate. This game has five Nash equilibria in pure strategies. Now, 
suppose one of the five balls is red, while the rest of the game is as above. This 
game still has the same Nash equilibria, but one of them is more prominent than the 
others. Next, suppose that the payoff for both players choosing the red ball is 80 
while the rest again stays as above. This allows for a partial Pareto ranking of the 
equilibria. The red equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by any of the white equilibria, but 
it is still the most prominent equilibrium. 
  Bacharach and Bernasconi (1997) showed formally how the most focal of the 
NE can be selected as the unique solution of this game.
17 The idea is the following. 
Players  do  not  choose  actions  as  such,  but  instead  classify  actions  into  options 
(partitioning the strategy set), and then choose an option. What is an option depends 
on what actions the players can distinguish, given the frame in which they perceive 
the  game.  In  the  present  game,  it  seems  likely  that  players  distinguish  only  two 
options: choosing a red ball or choosing a white ball. If a player opts for choosing a 
'white ball', then, following the Principle of Insufficient Reason, she randomly picks 
any  of  the  white  balls.  In  addition,  a  player  could  choose  any  ball  without 
distinguishing any characteristic. This means that the underlying game, for which the 
payoff  matrix  is  shown  in  Figure  2,  is  transformed  into  a  different  description  as 
shown in Figure 3, where the payoffs are the expected payoffs. Thus, for example, 
the expected payoff if both players choose 'white ball' is 25, as there is only a 1 in 4 
chance of both players choosing exactly the same white ball leading to a payoff of 
100.  As  we  see,  in  the  base  game  in  Figure  2  there  are  five  NE  (shaded):  four 
equivalent NE and one Pareto dominated equilibrium involving the focal point. In the 
                                                 
17 See also Bacharach (2006).   11 
transformed game in Figure 3 we have two NE: one in which both subjects choose 
'white', and one in which both players choose 'red', which is now the unique Pareto 
superior NE, and, in Bacharach and Bernasconi's terminology, the unique Variable 
Frame Theory (VFT) solution of the game. In other words, VFT formalizes the fact 
that one NE is more focal than other NE, and transforms it into the unique Pareto 
superior NE. 
 
  ++++ Figures 2 and 3 about here ++++ 
 
We now apply the same principles to our coordination game. Suppose that one of the 
100 payoffs is replaced by an 87 payoff. Following the previous argument, this game 
can  be  transformed  into  the  description  of  the  game  presented  in  Figure  4 
(Description 1), in which we distinguish three options: choose a row (column) with the 
focal point, choose any of the other rows (columns) that include two NE, or choose 
just any of the rows (columns). Figure 4 shows two NE in the transformed game, and 
the one involving the focal point is again the superior one. But there is a noteworthy 
new  element  here.  The  focal  point  was  not  a  NE  in  the  underlying  game,  yet  it 
emerges as the unique Pareto superior NE when looked at from the perspective of 
VFT. 
 
  ++++ Figures 4 and 5 about here ++++ 
 
However, if we return to the underlying game, we see that if the players are going for 
this  solution,  it  is  profitable  for  each  player  to  deviate  unilaterally  to  the  Nash 
equilibrium that shares the same row (column) with the focal point. We will call such 
a  Nash  equilibrium  (in  which  one  player  goes  for  the  focal  point  while  the  other 
chooses a best-reply to this) an Associated Nash Equilibrium (ANE). Therefore, one 
can  reach another  description  of  the  game  following  a  VFT  transformation  of the 
underlying game. That is, the option 'row with 2 NE' can be split into 'associated row 
with 2 NE' and 'other row with 2 NE'. This leads to Description 2 in Figure 5, in which 
we distinguish two types of NE. First, there is a NE with both players going for any of 
the other NE. But there are also two additional NE. The superior NE of both players 
going for the focal point is replaced by two equilibria with one player sticking to the 
focal point while the other deviates to the ANE. These two ANE are superior to the 
'other' NE. By this procedure, we have formalized the equilibrium selection, since two 
of the twenty-nine NE of the underlying game (i.e., the two ANE) are singled out as   12 
the possible solutions for this game. The application of the VFT principles can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
Theoretical observation 1: The principles of VFT imply that a non-equilibrium focal 
point can become the unique Pareto superior Nash equilibrium. 
 
Theoretical observation 2: The principles of VFT imply that a non-equilibrium focal 
point  can  transform  a  small  subset  of  NE,  the  ANE  ,  into  Pareto  superior  Nash 
equilibria. 
 
And  now,  we  can  face  the  question  of  what  are  the  participants’  choices  in  the 
coordination game. Are they enticed by the equilibria in the initial description of the 
game  (Description  0)  as  shown  in  Figure  1  with  one  100  payoff  replaced  by  a 
“treatment” payoff, e.g., 87, or by one of the equilibria in Descriptions 1 and 2, in 
Figures 4 and 5? The question is an empirical one that, as we will see in the next 
section, depends in part on the relative payoffs involved. To help understand how this 
can  be,  we  classify  the  participants  into  levels,  according  to  the  depth  of  their 
descriptive analysis and their resulting beliefs on other players’ levels.
18 
Level-0 players act on Description-0 (or initial) and best-reply to their beliefs 
that all other subjects act best-replying to their beliefs that all others act on the only 
description available, or Description-0. 
Level-1 players act on Description-1 of the game (Figure 4) and best-reply to 
their beliefs that all other players are either Level-0 or Level-1 in some proportion p. 
Accordingly, they will try to reach (depending on p) either the equilibrium with an 87 
payoff or the one with a 13.79 payoff. 
Level-2 players act on Description-2 of the game (Figure 5). But what happens 
if  a  Level-2  player  believes  that  a  sufficient  large  number  of  players  have  also 
reached his description level? If she moves to the ANE and the matched player also 
moves  to  his  ANE,  then  their  payoff  will  be  zero  (second  row  and  second file  in 
                                                 
18  This  classification  is  reminiscent  of  the  levels-of-reasoning  models  (Rosemarie  Nagel, 
1995, Dale Stahl and Paul Wilson, 1995, Antoni Bosch-Domènech, José Garcia-Montalvo, 
Rosemarie Nagel and Albert Satorra, 2002, Colin Camerer, Teck-Hua Ho and Juin-Kuan 
Chong, 2004, Vincent Crawford and Nagore Iriberri, 2007a), with a different variable frame 
description being attained at each level of reasoning. Yet, in the present description, players 
believe that a proportion of other players are at their own level of reasoning. By the way, 
sometimes  VFT  and  levels  of  reasoning  are  considered  alternative  theories  to  explain 
observed  coordination  results  (see  Nicholas  Bardsley,  Judith  Mehta,  Chris  Starmer  and 
Robert Sugden, 2006). But they need not be. In our game, considering a cognitive hierarchy 
of VFT descriptions may help to understand the experimental results.   13 
Figure 5). For their payoffs to be 100, only one of the two has to move to the ANE. In 
other words, one of the two has to best-reply as if a large number of the other players 
were at Level-2, but the other player has to best-reply as if others were at Level-1.
19 
Clearly,  the  players’  depth  of  analysis  may  vary  as  they  keep  playing  and 
learning the game. Consequently, it would not be surprising if a player who starts as 
a Level-0 player would end the game as a Level-2 player. 
 
5.  Hypotheses 




The underlying game we presented in Figure 1 without the focal payoff (treatment 
"100") does not contain any spurious focal points facilitating successful coordination, 
and hence it presents the players with a non-trivial coordination problem. 
 
But  when  we  introduce  a  non-equilibrium  Focal  Point  (FP)  to  the  underlying 
coordination game by shaving one of the 100 payoffs, this will substantially enhance 
coordination success. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 2: 
In the 46, 87 and 99 treatments we will observe more coordination success than in 
the 100 treatment. 
 
As the attraction of the FP as well as the temptation to deviate from it may depend on 
the amount of the focal payoff: 
Hypothesis 2b: 
The larger the focal payoff, the higher the coordination success. 
 
Hypothesis 3: 
The coordination enhancement in the focal treatments mentioned in hypothesis 2 is 
achieved by coordinating either on the FP (even though not an equilibrium itself) or 
on any of the ANE, and not by improved coordination on the other NE. 
 
                                                 
19 Here we have to depart from Bacharach’s theory, where two players who reach the same 
description will choose the same strategy. But his theory of team reasoning could be relevant 
with Description-2 of the game, when payoff maximization requires that the matched subjects 
do not choose the same strategy.   14 
Hypothesis 3b: 
The larger the focal payoff, the more subjects make use of the FP (choosing either 
the focal or associated action), and the greater the role played by the FP relative to 
the ANE. 
 
As  argued  above,  the  FP  is  not  an  equilibrium,  and  each  player  could  deviate 
unilaterally to one of the ANE. However, if both column and row players  were to 
make such a move, miscoordination with a payoff of zero would result. Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 4:  
In each session, to the extent that the ANE are used successfully to coordinate, the 
relative shares of coordination success of ANE1 and ANE2 will not be 50-50, but one 
of the two will become dominant. 
 




6.  Experimental results 
In this section we present the substance of the experimental evidence supporting the 
two new roles of focal points, quantifying their effect, and thus providing a test of the 
hypotheses discussed above. For a detailed analysis of the experiment we refer the 
reader to Appendix 1, where a number of experimental observations are described 
and statistically tested. The references below to the numbered observations refer to 
these observations in Appendix 1. 
  A first summary of the results appear in Table 1, which presents the average 
earnings (excluding the show-up fee of €3.00) per player for each treatment in both 
experiments combined (one-shot plus 50 periods). In broad terms, Table 1 shows 
that coordination is enhanced by the introduction of a non-equilibrium focal point, and 
that  it  increases  with  the  amount  of  the  focal  payoff.  We  now  turn  to  a  detailed 
analysis of the experimental results. 
 
  ++++ Table 1 about here ++++ 
 
Hypothesis 1, that the initial game (Figure 1) posed a non-trivial coordination problem 
is largely confirmed. Figure 6 shows, for each of the four treatments, the average 
number of times that players choose the focal action, the associated action, and the   15 





++++ Figure 6 about here ++++ 
 
In the "100" treatment (see Figure 6, last entry) there was not one action that stood 
out  (Obs.  1),  and  the  coordination  success  was  not  higher  than  what  would  be 
expected from random behavior (Obs. 5). 
 
++++ Figures 7 and 8 about here ++++ 
 
Similarly, as illustrated in Figure 7, which shows the average frequency of the most 
chosen action (summed over row and column players) in each period in the "100" 
benchmark  treatment,  in  the  50-period  game  of  the  "100"  treatment  the  most 
frequently chosen action was selected slightly more than would be implied by random 
choice (Obs. 13), but this frequency did not increase over time (Obs. 14). 
In Figure 8, which shows the average expected payoffs in the 50 periods of 
the “100” treatment, we observe that they increase somewhat over time (Obis 16), 
and become higher than would be expected from random behavior (Obs. 15), but not 
substantially so (Obs. 17). That there is no spurious focal point was confirmed in the 
focal treatments  ("46", "87", "99"), as neither in the one-shot game nor in the 50-
period  game  (see  Figure  9,  which  shows  the  50-period  actions  in  all  three  focal 
treatments) is there an “other action” (apart from the focal and associated actions) 
that stands out (Obs. 2 and 18), and the frequency of the most chosen other action 
does not increase over time (Obs. 19). 
 
++++ Figures 9 and 10 about here ++++ 
 
                                                 
20 Several one-shot experiments have shown that participants “use subtle features of the 
experimental  environment  to  solve  the  problem  of  coordinating  on  a  common  mode  of 
reasoning” (Nicholas Bardsley, Judith Mehta, Chris Starmer and Robert Sugden (2006) p. 
34). Not so in our experiment. Perhaps because we have made an effort to eliminate any 
“labels” that could suggest “precedence”, “analogy”, “geometric configuration” or any of the 
rules that subjects may apply to coordinate. And, from oral debriefing, we know that even 
when they are aware of the focal point, the pull of a salient payoff apparently was often not 
enough to overcome the push of a lower payoff, at least before a process of trial and error 
leads them to coordinate. 
21 To find the most frequent action we take the sum of the most frequently chosen column 
and the most frequently chosen row.   16 
Hypothesis 2, that the focal point would substantially enhance coordination success, 
is fully confirmed. Comparing Figures 8 and 10, which show the expected average 
payoffs in the four treatments, we observe that the expected payoffs in the three focal 
treatments were significantly above those in the non-focal treatment (Obs. 6 and 24), 
and these expected payoffs were increasing over time (Obs. 25). As a result, the 
expected payoffs in periods 41 to 50 were 1.8 times higher in the "46" treatment than 
in the "100" treatment, 3.1 times higher in the "87" treatment, and 3.5 times higher in 
the "99" treatment.
22 
Hypothesis 2b, that the coordination success would increase with the amount 
of the focal payoff was largely confirmed. On average this was correct in both the 
one-shot game (see Table 3) and the 50-period game (see Table 6 and Figure 10), 
but some of the differences were not significant (Obs. 11 and 37). 
 
Hypothesis 3, that the coordination enhancement in the focal treatments is due to the 
focal point is essentially confirmed. The expected payoffs realized through any of the 
other NE are not higher in the focal treatments than in the non-focal "100" treatment 
in the one-shot as well as the 50-period game (Obs. 7 and 26 and Figures 8 and 10), 
and these expected payoffs do not increase over time (Obs. 27). As illustrated in 
Figures  6  and  9,  in  each  of  the  focal  treatments  subjects  make  use  of  the  FP 
(choosing either the focal or associated action) more than what should be expected 
from random behavior, in the one-shot as well as the 50-period game (Obs. 3 and 
20),  and  the  frequency  is  increasing  over  time  (Obs.  21).  The  expected  payoffs 
realized through the FP are not higher than those coming through the best of the 
other NE in the one-shot game (Obs. 8), while they tend to be higher in the 50-period 
game (Obs. 28). The same applies when comparing the coordination success of the 
best of the ANE with the best of the other NE. In the one-shot game there is not 
much of a difference (Obs. 9), but the best ANE tends to be more important in the 50-
period game (Obs. 29). The resulting expected payoffs realized through either the FP 
or the ANE tend to be higher than those coming through the other NE combined in 
the  one-shot  game  (Obs.  10)  and  the  50-period  game  (Obs.  30).  The  expected 
payoffs due to the FP as well as the ANE increase over time (Obs. 31, 32, and 33). 
                                                 
22  Yet,  we  also  observe  that  some  subjects  who  spot  and  play  the  FP  or  ANE  become 
discouraged after a while if they do not find the appropriate responses of their matches. 
Observing and using the focal cues may not be evolutionary successful in an environment 
where many participants do not respond to the focal cues. This observation is reminiscent of 
the  Ken  Binmore  and  Larry  Samuelson  (2006)  theoretical  conclusion  that  “increased 
monitoring  that  would  be  efficient  if  performed  by  the  whole  population  need  not  enjoy 
evolutionary success” (p. 40).   17 
Hypothesis 3b, that the FP is more frequently used the larger the focal payoff, 
and that the FP itself becomes more important relative to the ANE the larger the focal 
payoff,  are  confirmed.  Both  in  the  one-shot  game  and  the  50-period  game  (see 
Figures 6 and 9), subjects tend to use the FP more (choosing either the focal or 
associated action) the larger the focal payoff (Obs. 4 and 23). In the one-shot game, 
there is no significant difference in the importance of the FP relative to the ANE (Obs. 
12). But in the 50-period game, the importance of the ANE increases over time in the 
"46" and "87" treatments (Obs. 34), and related to this, the larger the focal payoff, the 
more important the FP becomes relative to the ANE (Obs. 22 and 38). 
 
++++ Figure 11 about here ++++ 
 
Hypothesis 4, that, to the extent that the ANE are used successfully to coordinate, 
one  of  the  two  ANE  will  become  dominant  is  confirmed  on  average,  although 
statistically this does not appear substantial (Obs. 35). Figure 11 shows the average 
relative share in the expected payoffs of each of the ANE for each treatment (see 
also Figure 10). As we see, in all focal treatments one ANE ends up being chosen 
much more often than the other.
23 Of the expected payoffs realized through the two 
ANE in periods 41 to 50, the share attributed to the first ANE is on average 83, 89, 
and 87% for the "46", "87" and "99" treatments respectively. The average shares 
realized through the first ANE increase from 51 to 83%, from 72 to 89%, and from 86 
to 87% in the "46", "87" and "99" treatments respectively, although statistically the 
increase  is  only  significant  in  the  "87"  treatment  (Obs.  36).  In  other  words,  on 
average it seems that row players learn not to deviate from the FP when column 
players tend to deviate, and vice versa. 
 
 
7.  Concluding remarks 
“When people are otherwise at a loss for how to coordinate, it takes surprisingly little 
to guide expectations and behavior” (Richard McAdams (2000) p. 1652). In the paper 
we  consider  a  coordination  game  with  a  large  number  of  equivalent  NE,  where 
players have a difficult time coordinating. But when one of the equilibrium payoffs is 
made salient by shaving its value, thus making it loose its equilibrium properties, it 
nevertheless  appears  to  induce  coordination.  And  the  degree  of  coordination 
                                                 
23 That groups of experimental subjects end up in one specific focal NE for no particular 
reason was also observed by Ken Binmore, Joe Swierzbinski, Steven Hsu and Chris Proulx 
(1993).   18 
depends  inversely  on  the  difference  in  value  between  the  focal  payoff  and  the 
equilibrium payoffs: less is more, that is, less shaving is more coordination.
24 
 
The following should be emphasized: 
1.  Focality  in  the  experiments  is  not  conferred  by  labeling  or  any  other 
“conventional priority”, but by shaving a payoff. 
2.  The salient payoff is not an equilibrium. 
3.  Variable  Frame  Theory  together  with  a  levels-of-reasoning  approach  are 
helpful in understanding the observed outcomes. 
4.  Focality plays an important role, but players do not come to it simply through 
introspection or precedent. Practice and learning are crucial. 
5.  In our game, where all NE are undistinguishable, the smallest shaving of a 
single payoff achieves the highest degree of coordination. 
6.  Players learn fairly quickly to discriminate between the two similar ANE. 
7.  The analysis in the paper is static. How subjects adapt and learn should be 
the subject of another paper. 
  
                                                 
24 Perhaps Schelling’s example of the painted line on the road is a good description of what 
is  happening.  Drivers  have  reasons  to  obey  the  line  even  if  the  state  does  not  provide 
enforcement of it. But if the state draws the line too far over, drivers will ignore the line. One 
could say that the probability that a certain convention helps coordination increases with “the 
strength of its case”, or, in our terms, the amount of the focal point’s payoff.   19 
 
Appendix 1: Analysis of the experimental results 
 
 
First experiment: One-shot 
 
The "100" treatment is a benchmark treatment, identical to the original game in Figure 1. The 
results  of  the  treatment  tell  us  how  difficult  the  coordination  task  is,  and  whether  there 
appears to be any spurious focality in the matrix. On average, in the "100" treatment, the 
number of times the most chosen action was selected is 4.3 (see Figure 6). This is lower 
than  the  maximum  to  be  expected  if  the  players  choose  uniform  randomly  among  the 
available actions, which is 4.5 (2.25 row plus 2.25 column players).
25 Hence, there appears 
to be little, if any, spurious focality attracting the players' choices. 
 
  ++++ Table 2 about here ++++ 
 
Experimental  observation  1  (one-shot):  In  the  "100"  treatment,  we  cannot  reject  the  null 
hypothesis that the median of the most frequently chosen action equals the theoretical value 
implied by random choices.
26 
 
This is confirmed by the average number of times the most chosen other action was selected 
in the "46", "87" and "99" treatments: 5.0, 4.2, and 3.7 respectively.
27 See Table 2 and Figure 
6. In other words, apart from the focal and associated actions (to which we turn below), it is 
not the case that there is a single row and column that stand out more than what would be 
expected for uniform random behavior. 
 
Experimental observation 2 (one-shot): In each of the focal ("46", "87" and "99") treatments, 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the median of the most frequently chosen other 
action equals the theoretical value implied by random choices.
28 
 
Aggregating focal and associated choices, the average number of times that the subjects 
made use of the FP is 8.2 (46%) in the “99” treatment. This number falls to 6.0 (33%) in the 
                                                 
25 We approximated this expected maximum numerically, simulating the uniformly random 
choice of players over rows and columns, and computing the maximum for one million runs. 
26 One-tailed binomial test. Here, as for almost all tests, we use the sessions as independent 
observations. We will indicate explicitly any deviation from this. 
27  Uniform  random  behavior  would  have  led  to  an  expected  maximum  of  4.3  in  these 
treatments. This is lower than for the "100" treatment, as the maximum is taken ignoring the 
numbers for the focal and associated actions. 
28 One-tailed binomial test, using the individual actions as independent observations.   20 
“87” treatment, and to 4.5 (25%) in the “46” treatment.
29 In other words, it appears that the 
players are attracted by either the FP or the ANE. 
 
Experimental observation 3 (one-shot): In each of the focal ("46", "87" and "99") treatments, 
subjects make use of the FP (choosing either the focal or associated action) significantly 




What is more, as can be seen in Table 2, the closer the focal payoff is to the NE payoffs, the 
higher  the  average  number  of times  both the  focal  action  and  the  associated  action  are 
chosen. 
 
Experimental observation 4 (one-shot): In the "99" treatment, subjects make use of the FP 
(choosing either the focal or associated action) significantly more than in the "87" or "46" 
treatment,
32 while there is no significant difference between the "87" and "46" treatments.
33 
 
What  do  these  observed  choices  imply  in  terms  of  expected  coordination  success?  The 
measure of coordination success we use is the expected payoffs, taking into account the 
actions of all players in a session and the fact that each given row (column) player is equally 
likely to be matched to any of the column (row) players in that session.
34 
 
  ++++ Table 3 about here ++++ 
 
In Table 3, we present the expected payoffs for the individual sessions for each treatment 
and how these are attributed to the FP, the two ANE, and the other NE.
35 As we see, there is 
                                                 
29 Two outliers seem noteworthy in Sessions 9 and 18, where the focal action was chosen by 
10 and 11 subjects. This appears to be a chance effect. It “reverted to the mean” as subjects 
went into the second experiment, as can be seen from Table 5 below. 
30 Since 18 players per session choose among 15 actions (ignoring the empty rows and 
columns),  uniform  random  behavior  would  lead  to  an  expected  frequency  of  1.2  players 
choosing any specific action. 
31 One-tailed binomial test based on individual actions, significant at any conventional level 
for each treatment. 
32 One-tailed c
2 test based on individual actions, significant at 10 and 1% respectively. 
33 Essentially the same applies to the focal action as such (with the significance levels at 10 
and 2% respectively), while there is no significant difference between the treatments as far 
as the associated actions are concerned. 
34 We use expected payoffs rather than actual observed payoffs, because the latter measure 
is  sensitive  to  the  actual  realization  of  the  random  matching.  Our  measure  essentially 
corresponds  to  the  coordination  index  used  in  Nicholas  Bardsley,  Judith  Mehta,  Chris 
Starmer and Robert Sugden (2006).  
35  We  distinguish  the  first  and  second  ANE  as  follows.  For  each  individual  session  we 
arbitrarily label the ANE that leads to the highest expected payoffs as "first", and the other as 
"second". We do the same, but independently, for the 50-period experiment. Notice that this   21 
some variation among the sessions, but not that much. The main exception is session 99.3 in 
the  "99"  treatment.  Whereas  the  average  expected  payoff  for  all  other  sessions  in  all 
treatments is 17, with a minimum of 7 and a maximum of 27, the outlying session 99.3 has 
an expected payoff of 77. If players choose their actions uniform randomly, the expected 
payoff per player would be just over 13 (depending on the focal payoff, it ranges from 13.1 in 
the "46" treatment to 13.3 in the "100" treatment). In the "100" treatment, the actual expected 
payoff  is  only  slightly  higher,  namely  14.2.  Thus  without  a  focal  point  there  is  little 
coordination  success,  and  there  appears  to  be  no  spurious  focality,  due  to  nuisance 
attributes, facilitating coordination. 
 
Experimental observation 5 (one-shot): In the "100" treatment, the expected payoffs are not 
higher than would be expected from uniform random behavior.
36 
 
In  the  focal  treatments,  we  find  somewhat  higher  expected  payoffs  than  in  the  “100” 
treatment, but in the "46" and "87" treatments this is only marginally so: 16.9, 16.5 and 29.1 
for the "46", "87" and "99" treatments respectively. 
 
Experimental observation 6 (one-shot): The expected payoffs in the treatments with focal 
point are significantly higher than in the "100" treatment.
37 
 
The expected payoffs realized through the other NE are 11.4, 7.2 and 6.0 in the "46", "87" 
and "99" treatments respectively, whereas it was 14.2 in the "100" treatment. This implies 
that the higher expected payoffs in the focal treatments seem due to the attractiveness of the 
FP and ANE as such, and not to improved coordination on the other NE. 
 
Experimental observation 7 (one-shot): The expected payoffs of the other NE in the focal 
treatments are not higher than in the "100" treatment.
38 
 
The expected payoffs realized through either the FP or the ANE is 5.5, 9.3 and 23.15 for the 
"46", "87" and "99" treatments respectively. We now compare this with the expected payoffs 
realized through the other NE. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
implies that these labels do not necessarily refer to the same ANE in the one-shot and the 
50-period experiment. 
36 One-tailed binomial test. 
37 One-tailed robust rank-order test, significant at 10%, 1% and 5% for the "46", "87", and 
"99" treatments respectively. 
38 One-tailed robust rank-order test. In fact, in the "87" and "99" treatments the expected 
payoff realized through the other NE is significantly lower than in the "100" treatment (both at 
1%). Similar observations can be made if we average over all the (other) NE.   22 
Experimental  observation  8  (one-shot):  In  none  of  the  focal  treatments  is  the  expected 
payoffs realized through the FP higher than those coming through the best of the other NE.
39 
 
Experimental observation 9 (one-shot): In the "99" treatment, the expected payoffs realized 
through the best of the ANE are higher than those coming through the best of the other NE,
40 
while there is no significant difference in the "46" and "87" treatments. 
 
Experimental observation 10 (one-shot): In the "99" treatment, the expected payoffs realized 
through either the FP or the ANE are higher than those coming through the other NE,
41 while 
there is no significant difference in the "46" and "87" treatments. 
 
Experimental  observation  11  (one-shot):  The  expected  payoffs  are  higher  in  the  "99" 
treatment  than  in  the  "87"  treatment  and  than  in  the  "46"  treatment,
42  while  there  is  no 
significant difference between the "87" and the "46" treatments. 
 
Next, we consider the importance of the FP relative to the ANE in the various treatments. 
The average expected payoffs realized through the FP as share of those realized through 
either  the  FP  or  the  ANE  are  34,  42,  and  44%  for  the  "46",  "87"  and  "99"  treatments 
respectively. 
 
Experimental observation 12 (one-shot): There are no significant differences between the 
"46",  "87"  and  "99"  treatments  in  the  payoffs  realized  through  the  FP  relative  to  those 




Second experiment: 50 rounds 
We now move on to the second experiment, in which the same subjects played 50 rounds of 
exactly the same game as in the one-shot experiment, with random matching in each period. 
 
We first turn to the "100" benchmark treatment, and look at the average frequency of the 
most chosen action (summed over row and column players) in each period, as shown in 
Figure 7. Table 4 gives the frequencies of the individual "100" sessions. We observe that the 
average frequency (4.9 for periods 1-50) stays just above the expected value in case of 
random selection of actions, namely 4.5. What is more, there is little variation in the average 
frequency during the 50 periods, with the average increasing from 4.7 in periods 1-10 to just 
5.2 in periods 41-50. 
                                                 
39 Wilcoxon signed ranks test. 
40 Wilcoxon signed ranks test, significant at 6.3%. 
41 Wilcoxon signed ranks test, significant at 7.8%. 
42 One-tailed robust rank-order test, significant at 5 and 10% respectively. 
43 One-tailed robust rank-order test.   23 
 
Experimental  observation  13  (50  periods):  In  the  "100"  treatment,    the  most  frequently 
chosen action is selected more than what would be implied by random choices.
44 
 
Experimental  observation  14  (50  periods):  In  the  "100"  treatment,    the  most  frequently 
chosen action does not increase over time.
45 
 
That the coordination problem without a focal point is a difficult one, and that the 50 periods 
do not help a great deal in converging on one row/column is confirmed by the fact that the 
degree  of  success  in  achieving  coordination  hardly  improves  over  time  in  the  "100" 
treatment.  The  average  expected  payoff  per  player  stays  well  below  20  (see  Figure  8), 
increasing from 13.42 in periods 1-10 to 18.09 in periods 41-50 (see Table 4). As Table 4 
also shows, there are only two sessions where the average expected payoff in periods 41-50 
exceeds 20, with the highest value being only 24.8. 
 
  ++++ Table 4 about here  ++++ 
 
Experimental  observation  15  (50  periods):  In  the  "100"  treatment,    the  expected  payoffs 
become higher than what would be expected from random behavior.
46 
 
Experimental  observation  16  (50  periods):  In  the  "100"  treatment,    the  expected  payoffs 
increase somewhat over time.
47 
 
Experimental  observation  17  (50  periods):  In  the  "100"  treatment,    the  one-sided  95% 
confidence interval for the median value of the expected payoffs in periods 41-50 ranges 
from 0 up to (but not incl.) 24.82.
48 
 
Thus, although in the non-focal "100" treatment the subjects somewhat succeed in singling 
out one action to achieve coordination, the effect does not appear substantial. In any case, 
we  will now use the data from the "100" treatment as a benchmark to analyze the focal 
treatments. The question, then, is whether these results change with the presence of a non-
equilibrium focal point. 
 
  ++++ Table 5 about here ++++ 
                                                 
44 One-tailed binomial test, significant at 3.1% for periods 1-50. 
45 Wilcoxon signed ranks test, comparing periods 41-50 with periods 1-10. 
46 One-tailed binomial test, not significant for periods 1-10, but significant at 1.6% for periods 
41-50 as well as periods 1-50. 
47  One-tailed  Wilcoxon  signed  ranks  test,  comparing  periods  41-50  with  periods  1-10, 
significant at 3.1%. 
48 One-tailed binomial test.   24 
 
Figures 9.a to 9.c present the average number of choices of the focal, associated, and most 
chosen other actions in the focal treatments. The individual sessions are shown in Table 5. 
We first  look  at the  average  number  of  choices  of  the most chosen  other  action. These 
averages decrease from period 1-10 to period 41-50 from 3.9 to 3.6, from 3.5 to 2.8, and 
from 3.2 to 1.9 for the "46", "87" and "99" treatments respectively. Thus, they remain at 
average values well below what would be expected from random behavior (i.e., 4.3). 
 
Experimental observation 18 (50 periods): In none of the focal treatments is the frequency of 
the most chosen other action higher than what would be expected from random behavior.
49 
 
Experimental observation 19 (50 periods): In none of the focal treatments does the frequency 
of the most chosen other action increase over time.
50 
 
The frequency with which the focal action is chosen increases from periods 1-10 to periods 
41-50  from  4.0  to  4.6,  from  6.0  to  8.2,  and  from  7.8  to  11.5  in  the  "46",  "87"  and  "99" 
treatments respectively. Similarly, these frequencies for the associated actions increase from 
1.3 to 3.5, from 1.6 to 4.6, and from 1.3 to 2.7. As a result, the number of subjects making 
use of the focal point (choosing either the focal or associated action) equals eventually 45, 
71 and 79% in periods 41-50 in the "46", "87" and "99" treatments respectively. 
 
Experimental observation 20 (50 periods): In the "87" and "99" treatments the frequency that 
subjects make use of the FP (choosing either the focal or associated action) is higher than 
what would be expected from random behavior.
51 In the "46" treatment, this is true as well for 
periods 1-10, but not for periods 41-50, or 1-50.
52 
 
Experimental observation 21 (50 periods): In all focal treatments the frequency that subjects 
make use of the FP (choosing either the focal or associated action) increases over time.
53 
 
We now make a comparison of the actions chosen across the various focal treatments. 
 
                                                 
49 One-tailed binomial test, considering periods 1-10, 41-50 and 1-50 for the "46", "87" and 
"99" treatments. 
50 One-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test, comparing periods 411-50 with periods 1-10. In 
fact,  in  the  "99"  treatment  the  frequency  over  the  most  chosen  other  action  decreases 
(significant at 1.6%). 
51 One-tailed Binomial test, significant at 1.6% for periods 1-10, 41-50 as well as 1-50. 
52 One-tailed Binomial test, significant at 3.5% for periods 1-10. 
53  One-tailed  Wilcoxon  signed  ranks  test,  comparing  periods  41-50  with  periods  1-10, 
significant at 5.5, 1.6 and 3.1% for the "46", "87" and "99" treatments respectively.   25 
Experimental observation 22 (50 periods): The higher the focal payoff, the more often the 
focal  action  itself  is  chosen,
54  while  there  is  no  such  significant  difference  between  the 
various focal treatments as far as the frequency of the associated actions is concerned.
55 
 
Experimental observation 23 (50 periods): In the "87" and in the "99" treatments, subjects 
make use of the FP (choosing either the focal or associated action) significantly more than in 
the  "46"  treatment,
56  while  there  is  no  significant  difference  between  the  "99"  and  "87" 
treatments. 
 
As a measure of the coordination success we look again at the average expected payoffs, 
allocating them, as above, to the FP, the first and second ANE, and any other NE. These 
payoffs are represented in Figures 10.a to 10.c. For details on the individual sessions in the 
"46", "87", and "99" treatments see Table 6. 
 
  ++++ Table 6 about here  ++++ 
 
Recall that if the players choose randomly among the NE, the expected payoff is about 13, 
and that in the "100" treatment the average expected payoffs in periods 41-50 stay below 20 
(18.1). In periods 41-50, in the "46" treatment the average expected payoff reaches 32.4, i.e., 
almost doubling the expected payoffs without focal point in the "100" treatment, in the "87" 
treatment the average expected payoff reaches 55.2, and in the "99" treatment it reaches a 
level of 63.5. 
In  the  "46"  treatment,  the  expected  payoffs  obtained  through  the  other  NE  and 
through the FP stay relatively constant. But this is different for the payoffs obtained through 
the ANE. In particular, building on the platform provided by the FP, the success of the first 
ANE increases dramatically. Eventually, in periods 41-50, in the "46" treatment it is one of 
the ANE that accounts for 70% of the payoffs related to the FP, while the other ANE is 
largely ignored (14%), and only 16% of the payoffs related to the FP come through the FP 
itself. A similar pattern can be observed in the "87" treatment. The first ANE is built on the 
platform of a focal point coordination. Eventually the first ANE leads to 57% of the expected 
payoffs related to the FP, while the second ANE provides only 7% of them, and the FP itself 
gives 36% of the expected payoffs related to the FP. Finally, in the "99" treatment, it is the 
FP that leads early on to considerable payoffs, in the end accounting for 63% of the expected 
payoffs related to the FP. One ANE becomes more and more important, providing eventually 
33% of the expected payoffs related to the FP, with the other ANE providing only 4%. 
                                                 
54 One-tailed robust rank-order test for periods 1-50, significant at 5% for "87" against "46", 
1% for "99" against "46", and 2.5% for "99" against "87". 
55 In fact, in periods 41-50, the associated action is chosen significantly less in the "99" than 
in the "87" treatment (one-tailed robust rank-order at 5%). 
56 One-tailed robust rank-order test, significant at 10 and 5% respectively for periods 1-50.   26 
 
Experimental  observation  24  (50  periods):  The  expected  payoffs  in  each  of  the  focal 
treatments are higher than in the non-focal "100" treatment.
57 
 
Experimental  observation  25  (50  periods):  The  expected  payoffs  in  each  of  the  focal 
treatments increase over time.
58 
 
As the following observations make clear, these higher payoffs are not due to an increase in 
the expected payoffs achieved through any of the other NE. As Table 6 shows, the average 
expected payoffs per period generated by the other NE over the 50 periods are 9.4 (evolving 
from 9.0 in periods 1-10 to 10.2 in periods 1-50), 5.9 (from 6.3 to 6.7) and 2.4 (from 4.2 to 
1.5) for the "46", "87" and "99" treatments respectively, whereas they are 15.7 in the "100" 
treatment. 
 
Experimental observation 26 (50 periods): The expected payoffs realized through any of the 
other NE are lower in the focal treatments than in the non-focal "100" treatment.
59 
 
Experimental observation 27 (50 periods): The expected payoffs realized through any of the 
other NE do not increase over time in the focal treatments.
60 
 
In other words, the increased coordination success must be due to coordinating on either the 
FP or the ANE. This is confirmed by Table 5. Comparing periods 1-10 with periods 41-50, we 
see that the expected payoffs realized through the FP increase from 2.9 to 3.6 in the "46" 
treatment, from 9.9 to 17.3 in the "87" treatment, and from 18.3 to 38.8 in the "99" treatment. 
Similarly, the payoffs generated by the ANE increase from 4.6 to 18.8, from 5.7 to 28.7, and 
from 6.9 to 21.4 in the "46", "87" and "99" treatments respectively. This leads to an increase 
in the share in the expected payoffs realized through the ANE alone from 28 to 58% in the 
"46"  treatment,  from  28  to  57%  in  the  "87"  treatment,  and  from  26  to  37%  in  the  "99" 
treatment from periods 1-10 to periods 41-50. As a result, the share in the average expected 
payoffs obtained through either the FP or the ANE reaches 69%, 88% and 98% for "46", "87" 
and "99" treatments respectively in periods 41-50. 
                                                 
57 One-tailed robust rank-order test, significant at 10, 1 and less than 1% for the "46", "87" 
and "99" treatments respectively for periods 1-50. 
58 One-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test, significant at 0.4, 1.6, and 1.6% for the "46", "87" 
and "99" treatments respectively for periods 41-50 against periods 1-10. 
59 One-tailed robust rank-order test, significant at 2.5% for the "46" treatment and less than 
1% for the "87" and "99" treatments for periods 1-50. Similar observations can be made if we 
average over all the (other) NE. 
 
60 One-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test, comparing periods 41-50 with periods 1-10. In fact, 
in the "99" treatment the expected payoffs generated by the other NE decrease over time 
(significant at 6.3%).   27 
 
Experimental  observation  28  (50  periods): In  the  "87"  and  "99" treatments, the  expected 
payoffs realized through the FP are higher than those coming through the best of the other 
NE,
61 while there is no such significant difference in the "46" treatment. 
 
Experimental  observation  29  (50  periods): In  the  "87"  and  "99" treatments, the  expected 
payoffs realized through the best of the ANE are higher than those coming through the best 
of the other NE,
62 while there is no such significant difference in the "46" treatment. 
 
Experimental  observation  30  (50  periods): In  the  "87"  and  "99" treatments, the  expected 
payoffs realized through either the FP or the ANE are higher than those coming through the 
other NE combined,
63 while there is no such significant difference in the "46" treatment. 
 
Experimental  observation  31  (50  periods): In  the  "87"  and  "99" treatments, the  expected 
payoffs realized through the FP increase over time,
64 while there is no significant difference 
in the "46" treatment. 
 
Experimental  observation  32  (50  periods):  In  all  focal  treatments,  the  expected  payoffs 
realized through the ANE increase over time.
65 
 
Experimental  observation  33  (50  periods):  In  all  focal  treatments,  the  expected  payoffs 
realized through either the FP or the ANE increase over time.
66 
 
Experimental observation 34 (50 periods): In the "46" and "87" treatments, the share of the 
expected payoffs realized through the ANE increases over time,
67 while there is no significant 
difference in the "99" treatment. 
 
The next two observations concern exclusively the expected payoffs realized by any of the 
ANE. The question is to what extent one of the two ANE becomes dominant. Therefore, we 
                                                 
61 Wilcoxon signed ranks test, significant at 1.6% for periods 1-50. 
62 Wilcoxon signed ranks test, significant at 3.1 and 1.6% respectively for periods 1-50. 
63 Wilcoxon signed ranks test, significant at 3.1 and 1.6% respectively for periods 1-50. 
64  Wilcoxon  signed  ranks  test,  significant  at  3.1  and  4.7%  respectively  for  periods  1-50 
against periods 1-10. 
65 Wilcoxon signed ranks test, significant at 5.5, 1.6 and 1.6% for the "46", "87" and "99" 
treatments respectively for periods 41-50 against periods 1-10. 
66 Wilcoxon signed ranks test, significant at 5.5, 1.6 and 1.6% for the "46", "87" and "99" 
treatments respectively for periods 1-50 against periods 1-10. 
67 Wilcoxon  signed  ranks  test,  significant  at  9.8 and  1.6%  respectively  for  periods  41-50 
against periods 1-10.   28 
consider the relative share of the expected payoffs realized by each of the ANE (see Figure 
11 and Table 7).
68 
 
Experimental observation 35 (50 periods): The one-sided 95% confidence interval for the 
median value of the relative share of the expected payoffs realized through the first ANE in 
periods 41-50 ranges from 1.00 down to 0.48, from 1.00 down to 0.55, and from 1.00 down 
to 0.43 in the "46", "87" and "99" treatments respectively.
69 
 
Experimental  observation  36  (50  periods):  The  relative  share  of  the  expected  payoffs 




We now turn to making a comparison between the various focal treatments. 
 
Experimental  observation  37  (50  periods):  The  expected  payoffs  in  the  "87"  and  "99" 
treatments are higher than in the "46" treatment,
71 while there is no significant difference 
between the "87" and "99" treatments. 
 
The next observation shows that the larger the difference between the payoff of the NE and 
the payoff of the non-equilibrium focal point, the more frequent is the use of the focal point as 
an equilibrium selection device rather than as the action of choice. 
 
Experimental observation 38 (50 periods): The higher the focal payoff, the higher the share 
of the expected payoffs realized through the FP relative to the ANE.
 72 
 
                                                 
68  That  is,  the  expected  payoffs  realized  through  the  first  ANE  divided  by  the  expected 
payoffs realized through either the first or second ANE. 
69 One-tailed binomial test. 
70 Wilcoxon signed ranks test, comparing periods 41-50 with periods 1-10, significant at 7.8% 
in the "87" treatment. 
71 One-tailed robust rank-order test, significant at 5 and 1% respectively for periods 1-50. 
72 One-tailed robust rank-order test, significant in periods 1-50 at 1, less than 1 and 1% for 
"87" against "46", "99" against "46" and "99" against "87" respectively.   29 
Appendix 2: Instructions and screenshots 
 
We first present the English version of the instructions. In the experiments we actually used a 
Spanish version (available from the authors upon request). 
 
Introduction 
•  We will do a series of 2 experiments. The specific instructions for the second experiment 
will follow later, once the first experiment is over. The instructions for these experiments 
are simple, and if you pay attention, you can gain some money that will be paid to you at 
the end of the series of experiments. From now on till the end of this experimental session 




•  There will be two equally sized groups of players (“yellow” and “blue”). Allocation to 
these groups will take place randomly and anonymously. Therefore, apart from knowing 
your own color, you will never be told who was in which group. 
•  The first experiment involves playing a game with another participant. To make pairs of 
players, each “yellow” player will be randomly and anonymously matched to a “blue” 
player. Note that you will never know the identity of the person you are matched with, nor 
will (s)he be aware of yours. Nor will you be told the payoffs of any other person. 
•  You will get a payoff table showing the various payoff levels that you and the other player 
can each obtain depending upon the action chosen by you and the other player. All players 
in this experiment will face the same payoff table. 
•  The actions for the “blue” players are shown on the rows, and for the “yellow” players 
on the columns. 
•  In each round, all players simultaneously choose an action by clicking on the row (for 
“blue” players) or column (“yellow” players) button of their choice. 
•  The resulting payoffs for both players are shown within the body of the table by the 
intersection  of  the  actions  chosen. The  numbers  in  the  table  represent  the  payoffs  in 
points.  
•  The points earned in this experiment I will be exchanged into Euros at the end of the 
session using the following exchange rate: Euro 1.00 per 10 points. 
•  There is no time limit for your decisions. 
•  We will do, next, a simple exercise with a fake payoff table to verify that you understand 
how the payoff table works. 
   30 
Exercise with fake payoff table 
 
Look at the payoff table below, and complete the following sentence: 
 
If the white player chooses row X and the grey player chooses column Y, 
then the payoff to the white player is:   . . . . . , 





1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
X 9 10 11 12
13 14 15 16  31 
 
Experiment II 
•  We will continue with the same “yellow” and “blue” groups as in experiment I. The 
colors assigned will remain the same throughout the experiment. 
•  In this second experiment, you will play 50 rounds of the same basic two-player game as 
in experiment I. This time you will be randomly and anonymously matched to a player in 
the other group in each round anew. 
•  As in the previous experiment, you will get a payoff table showing the various payoff 
levels that you and the other player can each obtain depending upon the action chosen by 
you and the other player. All players in this experiment will face the same payoff table. 
•  As in the previous experiment, the actions for the “blue” players are shown on the rows, 
while the actions for the “yellow” players are shown on the columns. 
•  As in the previous experiment, in each round, all players simultaneously choose an action 
by clicking on the row (for “blue” players) or column (“yellow” players) button of their 
choice. 
•  As in the previous experiment, the resulting payoffs for both players are shown within the 
body of the table by the intersection of the actions chosen. The numbers in the table 
represent payoffs in points. 
•  The points earned in experiment II will be exchanged into Euros at the end of the session 
using the following exchange rate: Euro 0.05 per 10 points. Note that the exchange rate is 
different in this experiment. 
•  There is no time limit for your decisions.  
•  After each round, you will be told the points you earned in that round, as well as the total 
amount of points earned in experiment II up to that round. 
 
 
Next,  we  show  two  sample  screenshots  from  one  session  of  the  one-shot  experiments. 
Figure 12.a shows the screen of a (blue) row player, while Figure 12.b shows the screen of 
the corresponding (yellow) column player. 
 
++++ Figure 12 about here ++++ 
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Figure 1.  Coordination game, Description 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 100 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 100 0 0
0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0
0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0
100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 100 0
0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 
   35 
 








































0 0 0 100 0
red ball 0 0 0 0 80
 
   36 
 
























row with  
focal point





row         with 
2 NE
100 0 7.69 7.14 13.33
any row 12.47 13.33 13.28
other row 
with 2 NE
0 7.69 14.79 14.29 13.33
any row   with 
2 NE
7.14 7.14 14.29 13.78 13.33
any row 12.47 13.33 13.33 13.33 13.28
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Figure 9.a.  50 periods: actions in "46" treatment
Figure 9.b.  50 periods: actions in "87" treatment
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Figure 10.a.  50 periods: average expected payoffs in "46" treatment
Figure 10.b.  50 periods: average expected payoffs in "87" treatment
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Figure 11.a.  50 periods: relative shares of average expected payoffs for each ANE in "46" treatment
Figure 11.b.  50 periods: relative shares of average expected payoffs for each ANE in "87" treatment
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Figure 12.b.  Screenshot for column player in one-shot game 
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Table 1.  average earnings per player across treatments




100 5.32  
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Table 2.  one-shot: numbers of choices in individual sessions
frequencies
session focal associated most other
46.1 1 1 7
46.2 2 1 5
46.3 10 2 3
46.4 4 1 6
46.5 3 1 4
46.6 1 1 4
46.7 3 0 6
46.8 4 1 5
avg. 3.5 1.0 5.0
87.1 4 3 4
87.2 2 2 6
87.3 6 0 3
87.4 4 4 4
87.5 5 3 3
87.6 3 0 5
avg. 4.0 2.0 4.2
99.1 2 2 4
99.2 6 2 4
99.3 11 5 1
99.4 6 1 3
99.5 8 2 4
99.6 3 1 6
avg. 6.0 2.2 3.7
100.1 n.a. n.a. 4
100.2 n.a. n.a. 5
100.3 n.a. n.a. 3
100.4 n.a. n.a. 6
100.5 n.a. n.a. 3
100.6 n.a. n.a. 5
avg. n.a. n.a. 4.3
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Table 3.  one-shot: average expected payoffs of individual sessions
average expected payoffs (points)
session FP 1st ANE 2nd ANE other NE sum
46.1 0.00 1.23 0.00 14.81 16.05
46.2 0.00 2.47 0.00 6.17 8.64
46.3 13.63 7.41 4.94 1.23 27.21
46.4 1.74 3.70 0.00 16.05 21.49
46.5 1.14 2.47 0.00 17.28 20.89
46.6 0.00 1.23 0.00 16.05 17.28
46.7 1.14 0.00 0.00 6.17 7.31
46.8 1.70 1.23 0.00 13.58 16.52
avg. 2.42 2.47 0.62 11.42 16.92
87.1 4.30 7.41 0.00 6.17 17.88
87.2 0.00 4.94 0.00 9.88 14.81
87.3 9.67 0.00 0.00 7.41 17.07
87.4 4.30 7.41 2.47 3.70 17.88
87.5 6.44 4.94 3.70 2.47 17.56
87.6 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.58 13.58
avg. 4.12 4.12 1.03 7.20 16.46
99.1 1.22 2.47 0.00 14.81 18.51
99.2 11.00 7.41 0.00 7.41 25.81
99.3 34.22 43.21 0.00 0.00 77.43
99.4 11.00 3.70 0.00 6.17 20.88
99.5 0.00 19.75 0.00 2.47 22.22
99.6 2.44 2.47 0.00 4.94 9.85
avg. 9.98 13.17 0.00 5.97 29.12
100.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. 16.05 16.05
100.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. 13.58 13.58
100.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 13.58 13.58
100.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. 12.35 12.35
100.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 14.81 14.81
100.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. 14.81 14.81
avg. n.a. n.a. n.a. 14.20 14.20
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Table 4.  50 periods: average frequencies of most chosen actions and
average expected payoffs in individual "100" sessions
  avg. freq. of most chosen action      avg. expected payoff (points)
session period 1-10 period 41-50 period 1-50 period 1-10 period 41-50 period 1-50
100.1 5.0 6.4 5.6 15.56 24.82 20.35
100.2 4.5 5.2 4.9 12.96 16.54 15.04
100.3 4.8 4.7 4.9 12.47 16.54 14.86
100.4 4.6 4.5 4.5 13.21 14.44 14.22
100.5 4.6 4.5 4.5 15.93 15.31 15.41
100.6 4.7 5.8 4.9 10.37 20.86 14.25
avg. 4.7 5.2 4.9 13.42 18.09 15.69
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Table 5.  50 periods: average frequencies of actions in individual "46", "87" and "99" sessions
average frequencies
focal choices associated actions most chosen other action
session period 1-10 period 41-50 period 1-50 period 1-10 period 41-50 period 1-50 period 1-10 period 41-50 period 1-50
46.1 0.6 0.8 1.1 0.9 0.3 0.7 5.1 6.8 5.7
46.2 3.1 4.0 3.4 0.3 1.7 1.3 3.8 3.7 3.9
46.3 8.1 7.3 7.8 2.9 5.8 4.3 2.9 2.0 2.7
46.4 7.3 8.5 8.6 1.5 8.9 6.0 3.4 0.6 1.8
46.5 2.8 1.2 1.9 0.9 0.5 0.8 4.0 4.3 4.1
46.6 1.7 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.5 1.0 4.4 4.5 4.4
46.7 4.6 7.0 6.2 1.9 4.8 3.5 3.9 3.9 3.8
46.8 4.1 7.3 5.6 1.2 5.3 3.9 3.9 2.6 3.2
avg. 4.0 4.6 4.5 1.3 3.5 2.7 3.9 3.6 3.7
87.1 6.2 10.2 9.2 1.8 4.3 3.3 3.6 2.3 2.6
87.2 5.5 8.9 8.0 0.7 6.5 3.9 3.8 2.0 2.5
87.3 6.6 9.5 8.1 3.9 5.5 4.9 2.9 3.0 2.9
87.4 5.5 9.4 8.2 2.5 4.9 3.5 3.6 2.2 2.6
87.5 8.5 8.4 8.5 0.4 4.3 3.1 3.0 3.1 2.8
87.6 3.9 3.0 3.1 0.3 1.9 1.1 4.3 4.3 4.5
avg. 6.0 8.2 7.5 1.6 4.6 3.3 3.5 2.8 3.0
99.1 6.1 13.4 9.4 0.4 0.2 0.5 3.8 2.1 3.1
99.2 8.5 12.4 11.4 1.4 4.6 2.9 3.0 0.9 1.8
99.3 13.1 11.5 11.7 3.1 5.4 5.1 1.3 1.0 1.0
99.4 7.8 11.2 10.2 1.1 3.8 2.9 3.0 2.1 2.4
99.5 7.8 11.7 9.4 0.7 1.0 1.3 3.4 2.2 2.7
99.6 3.7 8.5 6.3 0.8 1.4 1.7 4.6 2.9 3.5
avg. 7.8 11.5 9.7 1.3 2.7 2.4 3.2 1.9 2.4  
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Table 6.  50 periods: average expected payoffs in individual  "46", "87" and "99" sessions
average expected payoffs (points)
FP 1st ANE 2nd ANE other NE total
session per. 1-10 per. 41-50 per. 1-50 per. 1-10 per. 41-50 per. 1-50 per. 1-10 per. 41-50 per. 1-50 per. 1-10 per. 41-50 per. 1-50 per. 1-10 per. 41-50 per. 1-50
46.1 0.00 0.06 0.16 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.12 0.25 0.20 14.69 27.04 20.47 15.06 27.34 21.07
46.2 1.31 2.27 1.60 0.00 3.33 1.98 0.49 0.86 0.90 12.59 9.01 10.40 14.39 15.48 14.88
46.3 8.86 7.55 8.25 7.41 18.15 10.17 7.16 7.66 10.12 3.33 4.57 3.33 26.76 37.92 31.88
46.4 7.77 6.38 9.11 0.37 62.35 34.07 8.03 3.21 6.57 5.43 2.59 2.49 21.60 74.53 52.25
46.5 0.34 0.00 0.38 2.96 0.37 1.26 0.00 0.00 0.12 7.66 15.56 11.56 10.96 15.93 13.31
46.6 0.11 0.17 0.09 0.86 0.25 0.39 0.00 0.12 0.15 10.62 13.70 14.17 11.60 14.24 14.81
46.7 2.27 3.98 4.71 5.19 28.64 13.46 0.86 1.23 3.16 8.27 7.04 7.31 16.59 40.89 28.64
46.8 2.27 7.44 4.25 1.85 11.61 10.17 1.24 12.35 5.33 9.14 1.73 5.21 14.49 33.12 24.96
avg. 2.87 3.48 3.57 2.36 15.59 8.97 2.24 3.21 3.32 8.97 10.16 9.37 16.43 32.43 25.23
87.1 9.99 27.92 23.59 5.43 14.69 10.47 1.60 11.98 9.58 5.43 0.25 2.10 22.46 54.84 45.74
87.2 8.49 14.29 15.17 1.24 52.71 26.17 0.86 0.99 2.00 7.28 6.30 4.32 17.87 74.29 47.66
87.3 11.71 22.88 17.23 13.09 31.98 22.74 4.44 4.82 4.44 5.18 10.87 8.82 34.42 70.53 53.23
87.4 8.70 18.05 16.13 6.05 38.89 21.19 2.59 1.23 2.07 7.41 0.86 3.33 24.75 59.03 42.73
87.5 17.08 18.26 18.52 1.11 25.18 17.51 0.86 1.23 1.11 3.21 9.14 5.41 22.26 53.82 42.54
87.6 3.33 2.36 2.49 0.37 2.22 1.06 0.37 0.99 0.74 9.51 12.96 11.23 13.58 18.54 15.53
avg. 9.88 17.29 15.52 4.55 27.61 16.52 1.79 3.54 3.33 6.34 6.73 5.87 22.56 55.18 41.24
99.1 10.63 54.27 27.77 1.23 0.74 2.22 0.12 0.99 0.81 5.68 1.23 3.60 17.67 57.23 34.41
99.2 22.12 46.32 39.82 8.02 21.23 16.27 0.00 14.32 6.12 3.58 0.49 1.33 33.73 82.37 63.55
99.3 52.07 34.83 39.21 22.84 52.59 40.81 3.33 0.00 3.61 0.12 0.74 0.17 78.36 88.16 83.80
99.4 16.87 35.20 29.85 4.94 33.58 22.03 1.11 0.00 1.16 4.07 0.99 1.63 26.99 69.77 54.66
99.5 4.89 40.21 20.88 4.45 8.64 7.28 0.00 0.00 0.99 1.73 1.73 2.15 11.06 50.58 31.29
99.6 3.30 22.00 12.49 0.25 4.94 5.26 2.10 2.22 2.20 9.75 3.70 5.41 15.40 32.86 25.36
avg. 18.31 38.81 28.34 6.95 20.29 15.65 1.11 2.92 2.48 4.16 1.48 2.38 30.54 63.50 48.85  
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Table 7.  50 periods: relative shares of average expected payoffs for each ANE in individual  "46", "87" and "99" sessions
     average relative shares in expected payoffs of each ANE
     period 1-10      period 41-50      period 1-50
session 1st ANE 2nd ANE 1st ANE 2nd ANE 1st ANE 2nd ANE
46.1 0.67 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.56 0.44
46.2 0.00 1.00 0.79 0.21 0.69 0.31
46.3 0.51 0.49 0.70 0.30 0.50 0.50
46.4 0.04 0.96 0.95 0.05 0.84 0.16
46.5 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.91 0.09
46.6 1.00 0.00 0.67 0.33 0.73 0.27
46.7 0.86 0.14 0.96 0.04 0.81 0.19
46.8 0.60 0.40 0.48 0.52 0.66 0.34
avg.* 0.51 0.49 0.83 0.17 0.73 0.27
87.1 0.77 0.23 0.55 0.45 0.52 0.48
87.2 0.59 0.41 0.98 0.02 0.93 0.07
87.3 0.75 0.25 0.87 0.13 0.84 0.16
87.4 0.70 0.30 0.97 0.03 0.91 0.09
87.5 0.56 0.44 0.95 0.05 0.94 0.06
87.6 0.50 0.50 0.69 0.31 0.59 0.41
avg.* 0.72 0.28 0.89 0.11 0.83 0.17
99.1 0.91 0.09 0.43 0.57 0.73 0.27
99.2 1.00 0.00 0.60 0.40 0.73 0.27
99.3 0.87 0.13 1.00 0.00 0.92 0.08
99.4 0.82 0.18 1.00 0.00 0.95 0.05
99.5 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.88 0.12
99.6 0.10 0.90 0.69 0.31 0.71 0.29
avg.* 0.86 0.14 0.87 0.13 0.86 0.14
* The average for a treatment is weighted is computed as follows:  S(1st ANE)/S(1st ANE+2nd ANE)  